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TEAMWORK OR COLLUSION? CHANGING ANTITRUST
LAW TO PERMIT CORPORATE ACTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE
Dailey C. Koga*
Abstract: In an era of apprehension about climate change and the future of our planet,
private companies are increasingly recognizing their role in increasing sustainability and
lowering carbon emissions. To address this growing concern, some industry leaders are taking
unilateral action to implement sustainable practices, but other companies have made
agreements to fight emissions together. However, the Sherman Antitrust Act forbids
agreements in restraint of trade. Further, antitrust law traditionally has refused to recognize
ethical or moral justifications as legitimate reasons to permit anticompetitive agreements. As
society’s concern for the planet grows and elected leaders move slower than needed to address
climate problems, private sector actions take on a special urgency—especially given the
massive carbon emissions stemming from corporate activities. This Comment reexamines the
constructs and restrictions of antitrust law and identifies a solution that will allow companies
to enter agreements aimed at addressing climate change while still upholding antitrust law’s
primary goal: consumer welfare. Specifically, this Comment proposes an exemption to
antitrust law for agreements addressing climate change based on new Dutch guidelines and
also provides a framework for companies to combat antitrust challenges to sustainability
agreements absent an explicit exemption.

INTRODUCTION
In July 2019, four automakers—Ford, Volkswagen of America, Honda,
and BMW—struck a deal with California to decrease automobile
emissions.1 The deal emerged after the Trump administration announced
plans to roll back federal emissions standards from about fifty-five miles
per gallon to about thirty-seven miles per gallon.2 The deal resulted in a
new California law that sets emissions standards at fifty-one miles per
gallon by the year 2026.3 The automakers supported this law because the
higher standards would create more certainty about future emissions
*
J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2021. I would like to thank
Professor Douglas Ross for his invaluable guidance and insight throughout the drafting process.
Additional thanks to the editorial staff of Washington Law Review for their thoughtful suggestions
and incredible attention to detail.
1. Coral Davenport & Hiroko Tabuchi, Automakers, Rejecting Trump Pollution Rule, Strike a Deal
with California, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/25/climate/automa
kers-rejecting-trump-pollution-rule-strike-a-deal-with-california.html?module=inline
[https://perma.cc/CU8D-PGE4].
2. Id.
3. Id.
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standards, which they use to project car manufacturing needs.4 Given the
transportation sector’s contribution to carbon emissions, this agreement
could help reduce CO2 levels globally.5 Despite the benefits of the deal,
the Department of Justice (DOJ or Justice Department) opened an
investigation in September of the same year to determine whether the
automakers violated antitrust laws.6
The DOJ subsequently closed its investigation in February 2020
without comment or explanation.7 Four months later, a whistleblower
from the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division testified in front of the
House Judiciary Committee about his concerns over some of the DOJ’s
recent antitrust investigations, including the automaker investigation.8
The Assistant Attorney General for the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, Makan
Delrahim, responded with a letter, which made clear that the DOJ closed
the investigation because the automakers had never entered into
an agreement.9
Despite the Justice Department’s termination of the inquiry, the
investigation still raises questions for agreements involving moral or
social considerations—specifically those aimed at addressing
environmental problems. Litigants have repeatedly tried to establish an
exemption for moral or social considerations in Sherman Act analysis.10
But the Supreme Court made it clear in National Society of Professional
Engineers v. United States11 and FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers

4. Id.
5. According to the Environmental Protection Agency, the United States contributes 15% of global
carbon emissions. See Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY
[hereinafter Emissions Data], https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/global-greenhouse-gas-emissionsdata [https://perma.cc/HR43-LJDN]. Moreover, emissions from transportation make up 28% of the
United States’ emissions. See Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions [https://perma.cc/CNG89TY7].
6. Hiroko Tabuchi & Coral Davenport, Justice Dept. Investigates California Emissions Pact that
Embarrassed Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/06/
climate/automakers-california-emissions-antitrust.html [https://perma.cc/P887-LRNF].
7. Coral Davenport, Justice Department Drops Antitrust Probe Against Automakers that Sided with
California on Emissions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/climate/
trump-california-automakers-antitrust.html [https://perma.cc/5FEK-PLPK].
8. See Oversight of the Department of Justice: Political Interference and Threats to Prosecutorial
Independence: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2020) [hereinafter DOJ
Oversight Hearing] (statements of John Elias).
9. Letter from Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to
Honorable Jerrold Nadler, Chairman, and Honorable Jim Jordan, Ranking Member, H. Comm. on the
Judiciary (July 1, 2020), https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000173-0d14-dd78-a9ff-7fb6e2a70000
[https://perma.cc/SAL5-C9YC].
10. See infra section II.B.
11. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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Ass’n12 that non-economic considerations have no place in Sherman Act
analysis.13 While some lower courts have appeared to consider noneconomic factors when they are cleverly framed in economic terms,14 the
Supreme Court has consistently applied the precedent from National
Society of Professional Engineers and Superior Court Trial Lawyers
over time.15
As the threat of climate change continues to loom, finding a path
forward has proven exceedingly difficult. Major corporations contribute a
significant amount to climate change but have done little to combat it.16
However, that could soon change. Larry Fink, CEO of BlackRock
Investments, issued his annual letter to CEOs in January 2020 in which he
recognized the impact of climate change on business and investment.17 He
also vowed BlackRock’s commitment to addressing sustainability.18 This
letter served as a kind of call to action, spurring other large companies to
issue statements regarding their own commitment to climate change.19 But
while a company like BlackRock—which manages almost $7 trillion in
investments20—can afford to allocate significant resources to

12. 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
13. See Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 694–95; Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S.
at 421–22.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 678–79 (3d Cir. 1993) (ordering the district
court to perform a full rule of reason analysis to consider the argument that collusion was necessary
to help individuals with lower socioeconomic statuses access Ivy League educations).
15. See Makan Delrahim, DOJ Antitrust Division: Popular Ends Should Not Justify AntiCompetitive Collusion, USA TODAY (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story
/opinion/2019/09/12/doj-antitrust-division-popular-ends-dont-justify-collusion-editorialsdebates/2306078001/ [https://perma.cc/5PGX-644M] (op-ed from the Assistant Attorney General of
the DOJ’s Antitrust Division justifying the agency’s inquiry into an agreement among auto
manufacturers and California, stating “[e]ven laudable ends do not justify collusive means in our
chosen system of laws”).
16. See, e.g., Matthew Taylor & Jonathan Watts, Revealed: The 20 Firms Behind a Third of All
Carbon Emissions, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/
2019/oct/09/revealed-20-firms-third-carbon-emissions [https://perma.cc/4B9P-88FJ] (stating that
just twenty private companies “can be directly linked to more than one-third of all greenhouse gas
emissions in the modern era”).
17. Letter from Larry Fink, Chairman/CEO, BlackRock, to CEOs (Jan. 14, 2020),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter
[https://perma.cc/JPA8-WXN3].
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Amelia Lucas, Starbucks Aims to Become ‘Resource Positive’ in Climate Push,
CNBC (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/21/starbucks-aims-to-become-resourcepositive-in-climate-push.html [https://perma.cc/C5DP-BJAJ] (discussing Starbucks’s intent to
become resource positive and to implement sustainable changes by 2030).
20. Andrew Ross Sorkin, BlackRock C.E.O. Larry Fink: Climate Crisis Will Reshape Finance,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/14/business/dealbook/larry-finkblackrock-climate-change.html [https://perma.cc/PBN5-S3FZ].
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sustainability programs, smaller companies may not have that luxury if
they are forced to act independently. Permitting agreements between
companies to further sustainability programs may enable smaller
companies to join in the fight toward a greener future.
This Comment proposes a path forward that would allow companies to
enter into agreements while still respecting the fundamental goals of
antitrust law.21 Specifically, this Comment argues that the most
appropriate channel for change would be a congressional exemption for
sustainability agreements. This Comment further lays out a way for
litigants to frame sustainability agreements so that they may survive
antitrust scrutiny. Part I of this Comment explains section 1 of the
Sherman Act, its history and purpose, and its application. Part II discusses
previous attempts to create exemptions to antitrust law based on moral
concerns such as building-safety or quality of legal representation. This
Part also describes how other countries currently permit sustainability
agreements within their antitrust laws. Part III provides an overview of
the role of business in the environmental crisis, highlighting the potential
impact that corporate action could have on climate change. Looking to
other countries for guidance, Part IV proposes a congressional exemption.
It then discusses a framework for litigants to use when defending
sustainability agreements in antitrust litigation absent a
congressional exemption.22
I.

SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT
Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes illegal “[e]very contract,

21. This Comment focuses on climate change considerations in Sherman Act section 1 analysis and
does not consider potential climate change antitrust violations related to other antitrust laws such as
section 2 of the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act. Separate questions may arise if climate change or
carbon emissions were to be considered in evaluating violations of section 2 of the Sherman Act or
under other antitrust laws like the Clayton Act.
22. Arguments to allow environmental concerns or other moral concerns to play a role in antitrust
law have been presented before. See, e.g., David Andrews, Antitrust Law Meets the Environmental
Crisis—An Argument for Accommodation, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 840 (1971). The Antitrust Section of the
American Bar Association has also examined the intersection of environmental issues and antitrust
law in the past. See generally Env’t L. Comm., Am. Bar Ass’n, Report of the Committee on Antitrust
Aspects of Environmental Law, 45 ANTITRUST L.J. 355 (1976). One recent article also discusses the
intersection of U.S. antitrust law and environmental concerns. See generally Paul Balmer, Colluding
to Save the World: How Antitrust Laws Discourage Corporations from Taking Action on Climate
Change, 47 ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS 219 (2020). Balmer’s Article furthers the conversation but
provides a much broader overview than this Comment. See generally id. This Comment builds on
Balmer’s Article in many ways, going into further depth on section 1 violations, proposing a specific
congressional exemption based on the new Dutch guidelines, and providing a framework for litigants
hoping to survive antitrust scrutiny. The concept should continue to be examined and looked at in a
serious manner as the search for solutions to the climate crisis intensifies and as governments globally
are not doing enough to curb climate change.
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combination[,] . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.”23
Courts broadly agree that section 1 cannot be read literally to prohibit
every agreement in restraint of trade because that would restrict nearly all
agreements made in the course of business.24 The Act thus only prohibits
persons and organizations from entering into agreements that have
anticompetitive effects.25 Anticompetitive effects typically include higher
prices or lower output but can also include a decrease in innovation or
other economic harms to consumers.26 The primary purpose of the
Sherman Act and antitrust law is to protect competition.27 Congress and
courts have created a number of exceptions to section 1 including
exceptions for sports leagues,28 labor unions,29 and states.30 Courts have
also held that agreements or actions protected by the First Amendment are
exempt from antitrust law.31
A.

Section 1 of the Sherman Act Forbids Agreements in Restraint
of Trade

Section 1 of the Sherman Act forbids agreements among individuals or
companies that have anticompetitive effects.32 Some conduct between or
among competitors, like price-fixing and market-allocation, is per se
illegal under the Sherman Act.33 Courts evaluate other types of conduct
under a rule of reason analysis, weighing the conduct’s anticompetitive
effects with any procompetitive justifications.34 Procompetitive
justifications often involve legitimate business reasons for entering into

23. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
24. See Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984) (“[E]very contract is a restraint of trade, and as we have
repeatedly recognized, the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit only unreasonable restraints
of trade.”).
25. AM. BAR ASS’N, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 2 (8th ed. 2017) [hereinafter
DEVELOPMENTS].
26. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1979)
(considering the innovative nature of blanket licenses to copyrighted music as a procompetitive
justification for an agreement that restrained trade).
27. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (“Taken as a whole, the
legislative history illuminates congressional concern with the protection of competition, not
competitors . . . .”).
28. See Fed. Baseball Club, Inc. v. Nat’l League of Pro. Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922).
29. See 15 U.S.C. § 17; United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941).
30. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
31. See E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138 (1961).
32. DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 25, at 2.
33. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
34. See Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343–44 (1982).
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certain agreements but cannot include ethical or moral considerations.35
Under the rule of reason, the court weighs the anticompetitive effects with
the procompetitive justifications to determine whether the conduct is
unlawful under the Sherman Act.36
For example, in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc.,37 two licensing agencies sold blanket licenses to copyrighted
music.38 Blanket licenses allowed consumers to purchase rights to use all
of the songs licensed by the music agency for one fixed price rather than
having to purchase rights to each individual song.39 CBS challenged the
licenses, arguing in part that they amounted to illegal price-fixing because
they effectively made the license-price for each song equal.40 After
holding that this was not per se unlawful price-fixing, the Supreme Court
remanded the case, instructing the lower court to conduct a full rule of
reason analysis.41 The Court reasoned that the blanket licenses were a
practical solution to a fundamental problem in the market—consumers
could save time and money by purchasing a blanket license rather than a
separate license for each song they wanted to use.42
Sometimes courts apply a level of scrutiny that falls in between a per
se analysis and a rule of reason analysis, known as a “quick look”
analysis.43 Courts apply a quick look analysis when a restraint is
“sufficiently anticompetitive on [its] face that [it does] not require a fullblown rule of reason inquiry.”44 In a quick look analysis, if direct evidence
reveals that an agreement has anticompetitive effects, such as raising
prices or reducing quantity, the court will invalidate the agreement absent
a procompetitive justification, without doing a full market analysis.45 In
other words, the court will not spend time determining the agreement’s
relevant market and the agreement’s effects on that market if the
35. See, e.g., FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 421–22 (1990) (“[I]t is not our
task to pass upon the social utility or political wisdom of price-fixing agreements.”).
36. See Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978).
37. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
38. Id. at 5.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 6.
41. Id. at 24–25.
42. Id. at 21–22.
43. See, e.g., Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th Cir. 1998) (applying a “quick look”
analysis because the restriction on annual compensation for coaches had obvious anticompetitive
effects). For a more detailed account of “quick look” analysis, see generally Edward D. Cavanagh,
Whatever Happened to Quick Look?, 26 U. MIA. BUS. L. REV. 39 (2017).
44. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 763 (1999) (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 128
F.3d 720, 727 (9th Cir. 1997)).
45. See Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 35–36 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

Koga (Do Not Delete)

2020]

12/16/2020 10:34 PM

CHANGING ANTITRUST LAW

1995

anticompetitive nature of the agreement is facially obvious.46
First and foremost, section 1 requires an agreement.47 There is a distinct
difference in antitrust law between what is known as “conscious
parallelism” and an actual agreement in restraint of trade.48 Conscious
parallelism encompasses activity undertaken by multiple firms who have
not explicitly agreed to cooperate, but who instead watch each other and
move simultaneously.49 A common example is that of two gas stations on
opposite corners of an intersection. If one gas station changes its price, the
other gas station would likely do the same. Although it would appear the
two gas stations acted in concert, section 1 of the Sherman Act does not
condemn such conduct without an actual agreement.
It is often difficult to determine whether two firms entered into an
actual agreement or whether they merely engaged in conscious
parallelism. To determine whether an agreement exists, courts look for the
presence of certain “plus factors.”50 Relevant plus factors may include
(1) whether the firms have opportunities to communicate, such as trade
association meetings;51 (2) whether the conduct the firms engaged in is
too complicated to be explained by conscious parallelism;52 and

46. Id.
47. See Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540–41 (1954).
48. See id. at 541.
49. See, e.g., id. at 541–42 (“[T]his Court has never held that proof of parallel business behavior
conclusively establishes agreement or, phrased differently, that such behavior itself constitutes a
Sherman Act offense.”).
50. See William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx & Halbert L. White, Plus Factors
and Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 393, 415 (2011) (explaining that Judge Richard
Posner has listed fourteen cartel plus factors: “(1) Fixed relative market shares, (2) Marketwide price
discrimination, (3) Exchanges of price information, (4) Regional price variations, (5) Identical bids
for nonstandard products, (6) Price, output, and capacity changes at the formation of the cartel,
(7) Industry-wide resale price maintenance, (8) Declining market shares of leaders, (9) Amplitude and
fluctuation of price changes, (10) Demand elastic at the market price, (11) Level and pattern of profits,
(12) Market price inversely correlated with number of firms or elasticity of demand, (13) Basingpoint pricing, (14) Exclusionary practices”).
51. See, e.g., In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 628 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining
that trade association meetings can facilitate price fixing); DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 25, at 14–15
(identifying meetings as evidence of an opportunity to collude). This plus factor is generally
considered to carry less weight than others and is viewed as insufficient on its own to show collusion.
DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 25, at 14–15.
52. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 n.4 (2007) (“‘[C]omplex and
historically unprecedented changes in pricing structure made at the very same time by multiple
competitors, and made for no other discernable reason,’ would support a plausible inference of
conspiracy.” (quoting Brief for Respondent at 37, Bell Atl., 550 U.S. 544 (No. 05-1126), 2006 WL
3089915, at *37)). “Conscious parallelism” is sometimes also referred to as “tacit collusion.”
Collusion, Tacit Collusion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 332 (11th ed. 2019).
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(3) whether the conduct lacks an explanation grounded in efficiency.53
Courts also assess whether the industry has factors that make it more
susceptible to explicit collusion.54 Often these factors speak to the
industry’s ability to solve “cartel problems.”55 Cartel56 problems include
agreeing on terms of the conspiracy, detecting and deterring cheating, and
preventing new firms from entering the market.57 For example, cartels
may have a difficult time reaching a consensus on price or output because
some firms want a larger share of the market.58 They may also lack the
ability to prevent new entrants into the market that could undercut
the cartel.59
Certain features of industries help cartels solve these common
problems. Markets with few firms, large buyers, consistent demand,
opportunities to communicate, difficult entry conditions, and transparent
prices are thought to be more susceptible to conspiracy.60 Additionally,
courts consider whether the industry has been subject to conspiracy in the
past.61 When an industry has these particular features, courts are more
likely to infer collusive activity.62
Sharing information is particularly concerning in section 1 analysis as
it provides a clear opportunity for collusion.63 Information sharing among
competitors is not per se unlawful, but it can be used to infer an agreement
to fix prices, or it can constitute a standalone violation of section 1.64
53. See, e.g., In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d at 628 (explaining that the defendants
increased prices even when costs were falling without an economically sound explanation).
54. Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 527, 529
(2013). “Collusion” is a term of art used in antitrust jurisprudence to refer to anticompetitive
coordination that violates antitrust law. See generally Price Fixing, Bid Rigging and Market
Allocation Schemes, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/atr/price-fixing-bid-rigging-andmarket-allocation-schemes [https://perma.cc/CYQ2-XU2F].
55. Baker, supra note 54, at 529 (explaining that “cartel problems” are “reaching consensus on
terms of coordination, deterring cheating on those terms, and preventing new competition”).
56. In antitrust jurisprudence, the term “cartel” is used to refer to a group of entities who agree to
engage in anticompetitive conduct. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 592 (1986) (describing an agreement among conspirators to maintain prices above a
competitive level as a price-fixing cartel).
57. Baker, supra note 54, at 529.
58. See Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines Cartel Success?, 44 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 43, 45–46 (2006).
59. See id. at 49, 74–75.
60. See id. at 49, 57, 61, 64, 69, 74–75.
61. See id. at 67.
62. See Kovacic et al., supra note 50, at 435.
63. See, e.g., In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 628 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Of note is
the allegation in the complaint that the defendants belonged to a trade association and exchanged price
information directly at association meetings.”).
64. See Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 198–99 (2d Cir. 2001).
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Courts consider a number of factors when determining whether an
exchange of information violates the Sherman Act, such as the type of
information exchanged and the particular features of the relevant
industry.65 Courts view the exchange of price information as particularly
suspicious.66 Some information sharing, like collaboration on research
and development, or use of an unbiased organization to set industry
standards, is typically permitted.67
B.

Original Intent of the Sherman Act

Courts frequently inquire into Congress’s intent to determine the
correct application of a statute, especially when a statute is ambiguous on
its face.68 The brevity of the Sherman Act has increased the focus of both
scholars and courts on the original intent of the Act, including whether
social and moral factors have relevance in Sherman Act analysis.69
Debate surrounding the original intent of the Sherman Act spans far
back into the law’s history.70 Indeed, some scholars and courts originally
opined that the Sherman Act had social and political aims.71 But economic
theory shifted in the late 1950s and 1960s to reflect what is now known
as the “Chicago School of Economics.”72 In the view of the Chicago
School, markets self-regulate, consumers are rational beings, and
government intervention impedes economic progress.73 One notable
Chicago School antitrust scholar, Robert Bork, authored a groundbreaking
article in 1966 arguing that the Sherman Act’s legislative history clearly
reflected the law’s original intent: “the maximization of wealth or
consumer want satisfaction.”74
The Bork and Chicago School model became the majority view of both
65. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978).
66. Id.
67. Inara Scott, Antitrust and Socially Responsible Collaboration: A Chilling Combination?, 53
AM. BUS. L.J. 97, 97–98, 98 n.4 (2016).
68. Carlos E. González, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REV. 585, 605 (1996).
69. See generally Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. &
ECON. 7 (1966); Douglas H. Ginsburg, Bork’s “Legislative Intent” and the Courts, 79 ANTITRUST
L.J. 941 (2014).
70. Ginsburg, supra note 69, at 942.
71. See id.
72. Daniel Yergin & Joseph Stanislaw, The Chicago School, in COMMANDING HEIGHTS 145, 145–
49 (1998), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitext/ess_chicagoschool.html
[https://perma.cc/S3Z7-6GX9].
73. Id.
74. Bork, supra note 69, at 7. Some scholars even argue that Bork’s article changed the opinion of
the Court, as it was cited in court opinions and the analysis was quickly adopted by courts. See
Ginsburg, supra note 69, at 944–45.
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courts and scholars, and has held steady over a number of decades.75 In
fact, some courts and scholars have gone to great lengths to emphasize
that the original intent of the Sherman Act did not encompass anything
beyond consumer welfare.76 Bork repeatedly emphasized this, explaining
that “[t]he legislative history . . . contains no colorable support for
application by courts of any value premise or policy other than the
maximization of consumer welfare.”77 Though “consumer welfare” could
plausibly be interpreted broadly as encompassing more than just
economic well-being, scholars like Bork argue that the legislative history
shows that the “meaning was unmistakable.”78 These scholars argue that
courts were not expected or meant to consider non-economic factors, but
instead, under the rule of reason, were confined to weighing the economic
consequences of agreements.79
In contrast to the majority view, some scholars have argued that the
Sherman Act’s congressional history reflects populist ideals and Congress
was not solely focused on consumer want satisfaction.80 Specifically,
some scholars and judges have argued that the intent of the Sherman Act
went beyond the maximization of wealth and courts were meant to
consider social and political factors.81 These scholars, however, are in
the minority.82
C.

Exemptions to Sherman Act Section 1

Congress has the ability to grant exemptions to antitrust law and has
done so in the past.83 The American Bar Association’s Antitrust Section
has urged a four-part test by which to judge whether a congressional

75. Ginsburg, supra note 69, at 943–47.
76. Bork, supra note 69, at 10.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 10–11.
80. See generally Christopher Grandy, Original Intent and the Sherman Antitrust Act: A Reexamination of the Consumer-Welfare Hypothesis, 53 J. ECON. HIST. 359 (1993).
81. See, e.g., GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Cont’l T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 1019 (9th Cir. 1976) (Browning,
J., dissenting), aff’d, 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (“The congressional debates reflect a concern not only with
the consumer interest in price, quality, and quantity of goods and services, but also with society’s
interest in the protection of the independent businessman, for reasons of social and political as well
as economic policy.”).
82. See Grandy, supra note 80, at 359 (“[T]he ‘Chicago School’ of antitrust has carried the day in
both academic and public policy circles, and the conventional wisdom has incorporated Bork’s view
of the Sherman Act.”).
83. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 17 (laying out an exemption for labor organizations). For a more
comprehensive guide on antitrust exemptions and the kinds of exemptions that exist, see generally
DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 25, at 1277–1560.
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exemption is appropriate.84 According to the ABA, congressional
exemptions should only be granted (1) in rare circumstances after
“rigorous consideration of the impact of the proposed exemption or
immunity on consumer welfare,” (2) when drafted in the narrowest
possible way such that “competition is reduced only to the minimum
extent necessary to achieve the intended goal,” (3) the goals of the
exemption outweigh the goals of antitrust laws, and (4) the drafted
exemption has a sunset provision.85 This test is not binding, but it
spotlights the types of things Congress may consider when determining
whether to grant an exemption.
Antitrust exemptions granted by Congress exist in a broad range of
industries and frequently reflect an attempt to further national policy
interests.86 Some of these exemptions are unsurprising.87 Others are more
unusual and heavily debated.88 Labor unions represent one prominent
example.89 Namely, labor unions have the power to reach agreements on
behalf of their members “[s]o long as a union acts in its self-interest and
does not combine with non-labor groups.”90 Two other notable
exemptions are rooted in two amendments to the U.S. Constitution—the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine and the state action doctrine.
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine91 clarifies that lobbying is protected by
the First Amendment and therefore it cannot be considered a violation of
antitrust law.92 In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc.,93 a group of truck operators sued a group of railroads,
arguing that their hiring of a public relations firm to “conduct a publicity
campaign against the truckers” violated the Sherman Act.94 The publicity
campaign was allegedly aimed at convincing government officials to pass

84. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. ANTITRUST DIV., ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION SERIES ON COMPETITION &
DEREGULATION 7 (2018) [hereinafter DOJ ROUNDTABLE], https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/
file/1120641/download [https://perma.cc/3NBC-E2ZL].
85. Id. A sunset provision or law is one that “automatically terminates at the end of a fixed period
unless it is formally renewed.” Sunset Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1737 (11th ed. 2019).
86. See, e.g., DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 25, at 1317 (“Concern about the economic well-being of
U.S. farmers and ranchers has been a factor in passage of the nation’s major antitrust legislation.”).
87. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 17 (antitrust exemption for labor organizations).
88. See, e.g., id. § 1291 (antitrust exemption for televising NFL games).
89. See id. § 17; DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 25, at 1491–99.
90. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941).
91. The Noerr-Pennington exemption is named after a pair of cases that established the doctrine:
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), and
United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
92. See E. R.R. Presidents Conf., 365 U.S. at 136; United Mine Workers of Am., 381 U.S. at 670.
93. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
94. Id. at 129.
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and veto legislation in ways that would be beneficial to the railroads and
harmful to the truckers.95 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
railroads, holding that “the Sherman Act does not prohibit two or more
persons from associating together in an attempt to persuade the legislature
or the executive to take particular action with respect to a law that would
produce a restraint or a monopoly.”96 However, the Court recognized that
instances could arise where an effort to influence legislation “is a mere
sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere
directly with the business relationships of a competitor.”97 If the lobbying
is a “mere sham,” the Sherman Act can be applied appropriately.98
In United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington,99 small coal mine
operators filed a claim against large coal operators and their union,
arguing that the large operators and the union conspired to exclude the
smaller, non-union operators from the market.100 The large coal mine
operators’ union successfully petitioned the Secretary of Labor to amend
federal law to establish “a minimum wage for employees of contractors
selling coal to” the Tennessee Valley Authority101—a federally owned
power company.102 The small coal mine operators argued that the change
in law would have anticompetitive results because it would directly raise
operating costs for all coal mine operators, including the small, non-union
operators.103 Ultimately, those increased operating costs could drive the
smaller operators out of business.104 The lower courts ruled in favor of the
small operators, but the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding
that the lower courts did not properly consider the holding in Noerr.105
The Court made clear again that “[j]oint efforts to influence public
officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to
eliminate competition.”106
However, in Superior Court Trial Lawyers, the Supreme Court made
clear that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine does not apply to all lobbying

95. Id.
96. Id. at 136.
97. Id. at 144.
98. Id.
99. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
100. Id. at 659–60.
101. Id. at 660.
102. See 16 U.S.C. § 831.
103. United Mine Workers, 381 U.S. at 664.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 669–70.
106. Id. at 670.
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efforts.107 In this case, a group of court-appointed attorneys108 conspired
to refuse to represent indigent criminal defendants until the District of
Columbia raised their compensation.109 While upholding its decisions in
Noerr and its progeny, the Court distinguished the boycott in Superior
Court Trial Lawyers, stating: “[I]n the Noerr case the alleged restraint of
trade was the intended consequence of public action; in this case the
boycott was the means by which respondents sought to obtain favorable
legislation.”110 Specifically, in Noerr, the truckers argued that the result
of the railroads’ lobbying—a near monopoly in transportation of goods—
would be an unlawful restraint of trade.111 The Court disagreed because
the lobbying was protected, regardless of whether it resulted in a restraint
of trade.112 In contrast, the FTC argued in Superior Court Trial Lawyers
that the initial agreement between the attorneys to boycott for higher
wages was an unlawful restraint of trade.113 The Court agreed with the
FTC that the group boycott was an unlawful agreement that directly
resulted in higher prices, rather than a lawful lobbying attempt.114
Another constitutional exemption is known as the state action
immunity doctrine or Parker immunity.115 Under the state action
immunity doctrine, states have immunity for “anticompetitive
conduct . . . when acting in their sovereign capacity.”116 Non-state actors
can find protection under the state action exemption if they are “carrying
out the State’s regulatory program.”117 A private party must meet two
requirements to invoke state action immunity: (1) the restraint must be
“clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy,” and
(2) the state must actively supervise the policy.118
107. See FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 424 (1990) (“Respondents’
agreement is not outside the coverage of the Sherman Act simply because its objective was the
enactment of favorable legislation.”).
108. These attorneys were not public defenders, but instead were attorneys in private practice who
were appointed by the court to represent less serious cases under the District of Columbia’s Criminal
Justice Act. Id. at 414–15. Pursuant to the Act, the attorneys were compensated $30 per hour for incourt time and $20 per hour for out-of-court time. Id. at 415. Through the boycott, the attorneys were
asking for $55 per hour for in-court time and $45 per hour for out-of-court time. Id. at 415–16.
109. Id. at 415–16.
110. Id. at 424–25 (emphasis in original).
111. E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 129 (1961).
112. Id. at 136.
113. Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 418.
114. Id. at 425.
115. See DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 25, at 1277.
116. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494, 503 (2015).
117. FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 225 (2013).
118. Id. (quoting Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980)).
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The Supreme Court first laid out the state action immunity doctrine in
Parker v. Brown.119 In Parker, the Court upheld a program in California
that regulated the amount of raisins each supplier could sell and the price
at which they could sell the raisins.120 The program stemmed from the
California Agricultural Prorate Act.121 The explicit purpose of the Act was
to decrease competition among growers in order to stabilize commodity
prices.122 In this case, the Court was unwavering in the Sherman Act’s
inapplicability to states: “The Sherman Act makes no mention of
[states] . . . and gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state action
or official action directed by a state.”123
While the Noerr-Pennington and state action immunity doctrines are
broad exemptions, exemptions to antitrust law can be narrow and
industry-specific.124 Though some advocates and litigants have tried to
establish exemptions to the antitrust laws for moral or social
considerations, those efforts have repeatedly failed.125 The legislature has
not granted an exemption for moral considerations, and most courts are
hesitant to stray from a long line of precedent and the broad language of
the Sherman Act.126
II.

ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH EXEMPTIONS FOR MORAL
CONSIDERATIONS UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT

Courts and antitrust scholars widely agree that the central purpose of
antitrust law is to protect competition.127 Most antitrust scholars thus
argue that there is no room in antitrust legal analysis to consider moral,
ethical, or social justifications for violations of the Sherman Act.128
119. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
120. Id. at 347–48.
121. Id. at 346. This Act authorized the creation of a nine-person, state-run committee and gave
that committee the authority to review and grant petitions for prorate programs for
agricultural products. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 351.
124. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (laying out antitrust exemption for telecasting sports games).
125. See, e.g., FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 419 (1990) (refusing to accept
respondents’ social justification for an anticompetitive agreement).
126. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (“Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade . . . is
declared to be illegal.” (emphasis added)).
127. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (“Taken as a whole, the
legislative history illuminates congressional concern with the protection of competition, not
competitors . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
128. See, e.g., Lee Goldman, The Politically Correct Corporation and the Antitrust Laws: The
Proper Treatment of Noneconomic or Social Welfare Justifications Under Section 1 of the Sherman
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Though litigants have repeatedly attempted to establish an antitrust
exemption for agreements involving moral or social considerations, courts
have rejected those attempts.129
A.

The Scholarly Debate Regarding Moral Considerations in
Antitrust Law

Antitrust scholars have long considered non-economic policy goals to
be outside of the purview of the Sherman Act’s rule of reason analysis.130
Many antitrust scholars argue that considering non-economic policy goals
would not only be outside of Congress’s intent in drafting the Sherman
Act, but it would also work directly against the Act’s effectiveness.131 In
their famed treatise on antitrust law, Phillip Areeda and Herbert
Hovenkamp argue that considering things like the importance of small
businesses or income inequality in antitrust law would lead to limitless
antitrust challenges to innovative practices and would therefore be
contrary to the primary purpose of antitrust law.132
Areeda and Hovenkamp also discuss another problem with introducing
non-economic policy concerns into antitrust law—differing interest
groups.133 The two argue that it would not be possible to factor in noneconomic policy concerns due to the differing goals and opinions of
various interest groups. For example, some groups may prefer big
businesses, while others may prefer small businesses.134 This would
admittedly complicate antitrust law, which works under the assumption
that all consumers want the same things: higher quality, lower prices, and
increased innovation.135
Despite the frequency with which litigants raise non-economic factors

Act, 13 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 137, 171–72 (1995) (arguing that social justifications should be left
out of antitrust law).
129. See generally Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912); Nat’l Soc’y
of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411.
130. See, e.g., Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., 226 U.S. at 49 (The Sherman Act’s prohibitions cannot
“be evaded by good motives. The law is its own measure of right and wrong, of what it permits, or
forbids, and the judgment of the courts cannot be set up against it in a supposed accommodation of
its policy with the good intention of the parties, and it may be, of some good results.”); Nat’l Soc’y of
Pro. Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 695 (“[T]he statutory policy [of the Sherman Act] precludes inquiry into the
question whether competition is good or bad.”).
131. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 104–05 (4th ed. 2013).
132. See id. at 105 (“A policy more hostile toward innovation is hard to imagine . . . .”).
133. See id. at 106–08.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 109.
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in antitrust cases,136 few scholars have come out in support of a social or
moral exemption to antitrust laws. However, some scholars have argued
that antitrust analysis should include non-economic concerns that affect
consumers.137 Professor Inara Scott argues that antitrust laws should be
more flexible to allow for agreements that address important social issues,
such as climate change.138 One of her specific suggestions calls for courts
to look at the effect of agreements on the economy as a whole, rather than
just on their specific market.139
Alternatively, Neil Averitt and Robert Lande have led the push for a
broader “consumer choice” method to antitrust analysis instead of the
traditional “consumer welfare” method.140 Averitt and Lande argue that
antitrust law should focus on increasing consumer choice rather than the
more restrictive model that focuses primarily on decreasing price and
increasing output.141 Much of the literature from Averitt and Lande
focuses on section 2 of the Sherman Act, which is outside the scope of
section 1, but it still provides a framework for including a broader range
of factors in antitrust analysis.142
B.

International Approaches to Environmental Factors in
Antitrust Law
Unlike the United States, other countries allow environmental

136. See generally Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912); Nat’l Soc’y
of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S.
411 (1990).
137. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 67, at 142–44 (“Antitrust law has the flexibility to allow for certain
types of socially responsible collaborations . . . .”).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 143. It is worth noting that this proposition would likely run in direct opposition to the
Supreme Court precedent laid out in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370
(1963). In Philadelphia National Bank, the Supreme Court enjoined a merger of two banks, striking
down the banks’ argument that although they would have a large market share in their local
geographical area, the merger would make them more competitive in New York and that New York
should thus be considered part of the “relevant market.” Id. at 360–62. The Court refused to expand
the relevant market analysis, stating “[i]f anticompetitive effects in one market could be justified by
procompetitive consequences in another, the logical upshot would be that every firm in an industry
could . . . embark on a series of mergers that would make it end as large as the industry leader.” Id. at
370. Nevertheless, an antitrust exemption from Congress could change this precedent, at least in
regard to sustainability agreements.
140. Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Using the “Consumer Choice” Approach to Antitrust
Law, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 175, 175–76 (2007).
141. Id. at 175.
142. See generally id. at 175–76.
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considerations to factor into competition analysis.143 For example,
Australia takes non-economic factors into account in its antitrust analysis
by using a public interest test.144 This test looks similar to the rule of
reason analysis that courts use in the United States, except it allows courts
to consider non-economic factors.145 Courts may weigh potential noneconomic detriments and benefits so long as those factors would have an
effect on the community generally.146 Australian courts interpret these
terms broadly: public benefits can include “anything of value to the
community generally . . .” and public detriments can include “any
impairment to the community generally.”147 Some antitrust scholars argue
for a similar public interest test to replace current antitrust analysis in the
United States.148 These scholars argue that antitrust law must take into
account other, non-economic factors to provide the best and most
complete protection for consumers.149
South Africa also uses a “public interest” test in its antitrust analysis.150
When analyzing a merger, courts factor in public interest considerations
by examining the effect of the merger on:
(a) a particular industrial sector or region; (b) employment;
(c) the ability of small and medium businesses, or firms
controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged persons, to
effectively enter into, participate in or expand within the market;
(d) the ability of national industries to compete in international
markets; and (e) the promotion of a greater spread of ownership,
in particular to increase the levels of ownership by historically
143. Most other countries refer to antitrust law as “competition law.” See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton &
Fei Deng, Antitrust Around the World: An Empirical Analysis of the Scope of Competition Laws and
Their Effects, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 271, 277 (2007) (calling the Sherman Act a “competition law” and
using the terms antitrust law and competition law interchangeably). These terms are largely
interchangeable and refer to the same body of law. Id.
144. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., POLICY ROUNDTABLES: HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS IN
THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT, 29–30 (2010), http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/cartels/
49139867.pdf [https://perma.cc/46ZN-5KF4].
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 30 (quoting Re 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd, Austl. Ass’n of Convenience Stores Inc. &
Queensland Newsagents Fed’n, (1994) ATPR 41,357, 42,677, 42,683 (Austl.)).
148. See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 618
(2012) (explaining that non-economic factors could be considered under the rule of reason). The
movement for a public interest standard in U.S. competition law has garnered intense scrutiny by
some antitrust scholars. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 INT’L J. INDUS.
ORG. 714, 746 (2018) (“Trying to use antitrust to solve problems outside the sphere of competition
will not work and could well backfire.”).
149. See, e.g., Stucke, supra note 148, at 624 (“Any antitrust policy, which seeks to promote wellbeing, must balance multiple political, social, moral, and economic objectives.”).
150. Competition Act 89 of 1998 § 12A(3) (S. Afr.).
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disadvantaged persons.151
For example, in Walmart Stores Inc. v. Massmart Holdings Ltd.,152 a
South African court considered a merger between Walmart and Massmart,
a South African retailer.153 After determining that the merger did not pose
any competition concerns because Walmart did not yet have a retail
presence in South Africa, the court turned its focus to the public interest
implications of the merger.154 The court had some concerns about certain
public interest effects of the merger such as employment,155 collective
bargaining,156 and the effect on local small businesses and suppliers.157 As
a result, the two companies agreed to undertake certain actions as
conditions of the merger such as creating jobs, allowing employees to join
labor unions, and “support[ing] local suppliers and in particular small
businesses and [Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act]158
suppliers.”159
The Netherlands is the first country in the European Union to consider
implementing a special analysis for sustainability agreements under its
competition law.160 The Dutch Authority for Competition and Markets
(ACM) released the proposal—the Draft Guidelines on Sustainability

151. Id. (emphasis omitted). While these factors are certainly important to moving society forward,
they are largely outside the scope of this Comment. Further research could be focused on an
exemption that could promote small businesses or businesses owned by marginalized groups.
152. No. 73/LM/Dec10 (S. Afr. Competition Tribunal June 29, 2011).
153. See id. at 1–2.
154. See id. at 9–10 ¶¶ 26–30.
155. Id. at 13–20 ¶¶ 39–58.
156. Id. at 20–25 ¶¶ 59–71.
157. Id. at 26–38 ¶¶ 72–121.
158. The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act was passed to address some of the
hardships suffered by Black South Africans during apartheid. See Broad-Based Black Economic
Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 (S. Afr.). The Act is aimed at increasing the “participation of [B]lack
people in the economy.” Id. For more information on the Broad-Based Black Economic
Empowerment Act, see generally Andrea Sekai M’Paradzi, BEE – Basis, Evolution, Evaluation: A
Critical Appraisal of Black Economic Empowerment in South Africa (2014) (dissertation for
Postgraduate
Diploma
in
commercial
law,
University
of
Cape
Town),
https://open.uct.ac.za/bitstream/handle/11427/4516/thesis_law_mprand001.pdf;jsessionid=598F0C1
A04C67CE53C5B9A774DFFB879?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/4XQ7-XG5Y].
159. WalMart Stores Inc., No. 73/LM/Dec10, at 39 ¶ 122 (quoting SACCAWU core bundle for
cross examination file record page 2503).
160. HOGAN LOVELLS, COMPETITION LAW AND SUSTAINABLE GROWTH: THE DUTCH
COMPETITION AUTHORITY CONSULTS ON GUIDELINES THAT PAVE THE WAY FOR MORE FLEXIBILITY
IN THE FIELD 1 (July 21, 2020) [hereinafter COMPETITION LAW AND SUSTAINABLE GROWTH],
https://www.hoganlovells.com/~/media/hogan-lovells/pdf/2020-pdfs/2020_07_21_competition-lawand-sustainable-growth.pdf [https://perma.cc/7U4F-PPXW].
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Agreements—in July 2020.161 The ACM presented two types of
sustainability agreements that may withstand antitrust scrutiny based on
the new guidelines.162 The first involves agreements that do not have
anticompetitive effects and therefore fall outside of antitrust law.163 The
second involves agreements where sustainability benefits outweigh the
anticompetitive effects.164 To fall into the second category, an agreement
must meet four criteria: (1) the agreement must have sustainability
benefits, (2) the ultimate consumer must receive “a fair share of those
benefits,” (3) the restraint on competition is not greater than necessary to
achieve those benefits, and (4) the agreement does not eliminate “a
substantial part of the products in question.”165
The Dutch Guidelines take a broad approach in two main ways.166 First,
they do not require quantitative evidence of sustainability benefits if the
companies involved in the agreement enjoy less than 30% combined
market share.167 Second, they take into account the future benefits of the
sustainability agreements for future consumers, rather than just the current
benefits for current consumers.168 This means that courts could consider
benefits to the environment as a whole, rather than only considering
benefits to the current consumer.169
Though the ACM is the first competition authority in the European
Union to propose such an exception for sustainability agreements, the
European Commission has expressed its support of the Dutch Guidelines
and is even considering adding a sustainability exception to the
Commission’s own competition rules in 2022.170 Taken together, these
countries’ methods could help inform the United States on how to
appropriately factor the effects of climate change into antitrust analysis.
C.

Specific Attempts to Establish Social Exemptions to the
Sherman Act
Litigants have repeatedly attempted to defeat Sherman Act claims by

161. See generally Autoriteit Consument & Markt, Guidelines on Sustainability Agreements:
Opportunities Within Competition Law (July 9, 2020), https://www.acm.nl/sites/default/files/
documents/2020-07/sustainability-agreements%5B1%5D.pdf [https://perma.cc/QT44-A2C5] (draft).
162. Id. at 7, 10.
163. Id. at 7.
164. Id. at 10.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 11, 13.
167. Id. at 13.
168. Id. at 11.
169. Id.
170. COMPETITION LAW AND SUSTAINABLE GROWTH, supra note 160, at 1.
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using justifications that traditionally fall outside the scope of antitrust
law.171 Limiting antitrust analysis to economic factors stems back to
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n,172 decided in 1897.173 In
that case, Trans-Missouri Freight argued that their rate-setting agreement
was procompetitive because the rates they had agreed upon were
reasonable and that absent agreed-upon rates, the railroads may
experience financial ruin.174 The Supreme Court refused to entertain that
argument, holding explicitly that the concern that the railroads would fail
was outside the purview of antitrust law.175 The Court also held that the
reasonableness of the set rates was not an appropriate justification.176
The precedent established in Trans-Missouri Freight has prospered
over time.177 For example, in National Society of Professional Engineers
v. United States, a group of engineers agreed to refuse to negotiate rates
with customers until the customer selected a specific engineer.178 This
agreement effectively eliminated the competitive process.179 The
engineers claimed that this agreement was necessary to improve the
quality of engineering in projects.180 The Court held that the engineers
could not agree amongst themselves to eliminate competition, even if
open competition would lead to undesirable results.181 The Court called
the National Society of Professional Engineers’ argument “nothing less
than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act.”182
Additionally, the Court emphasized that it did not matter that the
engineers engaged in “projects significantly affecting the public safety,”
adding that “[t]he judiciary cannot indirectly protect the public
against . . . harm
by
conferring
monopoly
privileges
171. See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 684–85 (1978) (denying
National Society of Professional Engineers’ argument that the engineers’ agreement to end
competitive bidding was justified because it would produce higher quality engineering projects).
172. 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
173. Id. at 338–39 (striking down argument that the rates agreed upon were reasonable).
174. Id. at 310–11.
175. Id. at 340–41 (“It may be that the policy evidenced by the passage of the act itself will, if
carried out, result in disaster to the roads and in a failure to secure the advantages sought from such
legislation. Whether that will be the result or not we do not know and cannot predict. These
considerations are, however, not for us.”).
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 424 (1990) (emphasizing that
the history of the Sherman Act makes clear that reasonableness of prices does not justify price-fixing).
178. Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 682–83 (1978).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 684–85.
181. Id. at 696 (“[W]e may assume that competition is not entirely conducive to ethical behavior,
but that is not a reason, cognizable under the Sherman Act, for doing away with competition.”).
182. Id. at 695.
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on . . . manufacturers.”183 Lastly, the Court emphasized that it is the job of
the legislature to regulate private industry.184
The Supreme Court expressed a similar sentiment about a decade later
in Superior Court Trial Lawyers.185 In that case, lawyers participated in a
boycott for higher rates of compensation because the District of Columbia
was only paying the attorneys $20 per hour for out-of-court time and $30
per hour for in-court time.186 The lawyers argued, in part, that the boycott
was justified because it was in the public’s best interest to obtain better
legal representation for indigent defendants.187 The Court ultimately held
that this was not a recognizable defense under the Sherman Act, citing
National Society of Professional Engineers.188 The Court again
emphasized that “[t]he social justifications proffered for respondents’
restraint of trade . . . [did] not make it any less unlawful.”189
In both of these cases, the Court clearly aligned itself with the Chicago
School190 and justified not considering social factors because markets
self-correct.191 In National Society of Professional Engineers, the Court
implied that market forces would put bad engineers out of business.192
Similarly, in Superior Court Trial Lawyers, the Court implied that market
forces would help determine the appropriate rate at which to pay the
boycotting attorneys.193
In some instances, courts have appeared to consider non-economic
factors, but those factors were always framed as economic in nature. For
example, in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,194
the NCAA restricted the number of college football games that CBS and
ABC could televise for NCAA member schools.195 Although the NCAA
still permitted CBS and ABC to negotiate with each school about the price
and broadcasting of individual games,196 the parties could not agree to
183. Id. at 695–96.
184. Id. at 689–90.
185. FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 423–24 (1990).
186. Id. at 415.
187. Id. at 419.
188. Id. at 423–24.
189. Id. at 424.
190. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text.
191. Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978); Superior Ct. Trial
Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 424.
192. Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 695.
193. Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 424.
194. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
195. Id. at 91–94.
196. The NCAA did also set a minimum amount that CBS and ABC were required to pay to schools
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televise more games than allowed by the NCAA.197 The NCAA also
required the stations to feature a game from a minimum of eighty-two
different member schools on their networks at least once during each
two-year period.198
The Supreme Court began its analysis of the NCAA’s plan by stating
that “[h]orizontal price fixing and output limitation are ordinarily
condemned as a matter of law under an ‘illegal per se’ approach.”199 The
Court then went on to say, “[n]evertheless, we have decided . . . it would
be inappropriate to apply a per se rule to this case . . . [because the] case
involves an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are
essential if the product is to be available at all.”200 In its analysis, the Court
emphasized that without restraints on competition, the NCAA may cease
to exist.201
The Court initially stated that its decision was not based on its “respect
for the NCAA’s historic role in the preservation and encouragement of
intercollegiate amateur athletics” but then quickly changed its tune.202
Specifically, the Court went on to say that the NCAA markets a “particular
brand of football—college football.”203 That brand of football can only be
preserved if athletes are unpaid and enrolled in school.204 Thus, in the view
of the Court, “the integrity of the ‘product’ [could not] be preserved except
by mutual agreement [because] if an institution adopted such restrictions
unilaterally, its effectiveness as a competitor on the playing field might
soon be destroyed.”205 Despite the Court’s insistence that its decision to
apply a full rule of reason analysis was not focused on amateurism, it
focused heavily on the topic throughout its explanation—explaining that
without an agreement mandating amateurism, an organization like the
NCAA could not exist.206
The Supreme Court then proceeded to analyze the NCAA’s plan under

for their allotted games, but the NCAA could negotiate pricing with each school separately. Id. at
92–93.
197. Id. at 90.
198. Id. at 94.
199. Id. at 100.
200. Id. at 100–01.
201. Id. at 101.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 102.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 117 (“It is reasonable to assume that most of the regulatory controls of the NCAA are
justifiable means of fostering competition among amateur athletic teams and therefore procompetitive
because they enhance public interest in intercollegiate athletics.”).
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a rule of reason analysis.207 Ultimately, the Court found that the NCAA’s
conduct violated the Sherman Act because its plan with the television
stations was not narrowly tailored, nor was it necessary to preserve
competition within the football leagues.208 Irrespective of its ultimate
conclusion, the Court’s willingness to conduct a full-blown rule of reason
analysis suggests that the Court viewed a largely non-economic factor—
amateurism—as a procompetitive justification.
Although most courts have refused to explicitly consider moral or
social justifications for anticompetitive conduct, one circuit court opinion
stands out: United States v. Brown University.209 In Brown, the Third
Circuit examined an agreement among Ivy League universities that only
allowed the universities to award financial aid based on need and set the
amount of financial aid given to commonly-admitted students.210 The
court seemed to accept the school’s justification that the agreement
increased access to education and diversity in education, even though
these factors are largely non-economic in nature.211 In essence, the court
in Brown framed increased access to education and diversity in education
as economic because they improve the quality of the product and thereby
enhance consumer choice.212 Some scholars have criticized the holding in
Brown for failing to follow longstanding Supreme Court precedent
established in cases like National Society of Professional Engineers and
Superior Court Trial Lawyers.213
Despite litigants’ repeated attempts and a few cases that seem to stray
from the general rule, courts do not consider non-economic factors to be
procompetitive justifications for the purpose of antitrust analysis.214 The
belief that antitrust analysis should be limited to economic factors has held
strong in over one hundred years of Sherman Act jurisprudence.215

207. Id. at 103–20.
208. Id. at 117–19.
209. 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).
210. Id. at 674–75.
211. Id. at 678.
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., Michael C. Petronio, Comment, Eliminating the Social Cost of Higher Education:
The Third Circuit Allows Social Welfare Benefits to Justify Horizontal Restraints of Trade in United
States v. Brown University, 83 GEO. L.J. 189, 215 (1994) (“By its ruling, the court has laid the
groundwork for a serious deviation from well-accepted antitrust analysis.”).
214. Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) (“[T]he statutory policy
[of the Sherman Act] precludes inquiry into the question whether competition is good or bad.”).
215. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 338–39 (1897); FTC v.
Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 423–24 (1990).
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III. ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS
Governmental bodies have been particularly slow and ineffective in
responding to climate change. Some government leaders have refused to
address environmental concerns completely, and a few have even pointed
to the private sector as a better avenue for change.216 The private sector,
on the other hand, has increasingly begun to realize its role in the climate
crisis—sometimes even viewing sustainability as a profitable endeavor.217
The automobile industry frames the issue well, emphasizing the impact
private industry could have on the climate crisis if given more freedom to
address the issue.218
A.

The Need for Private Contribution to Environmental Protection

At its core, climate change refers to Earth’s rising average
temperature.219 The ten hottest years on record all occurred between 1998
and 2018, with nine out of ten occurring since 2005.220 The five hottest
years on record occurred between 2014 and 2018.221 Scientists predict that
these trends will continue at least through the next decade.222 They also
estimate that humans have caused one degree Celsius of global warming
from pre-industrial levels.223 That increase is expected to reach
one-and-a-half degrees Celsius between 2030 and 2052.224
Climate change is expected to affect every part of our lives in the
coming years—and in many ways it already has.225 Climate change has
caused rising sea levels, loss of various plant and animal species,
increased ocean temperatures, heat-related illness and death, reduced food
216. David Gelles & Somini Sengupta, Big Business Says It Will Tackle Climate Change, but Not
How or When, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/23/business/corporateclimate-davos.html [https://perma.cc/WJW8-JE28].
217. See, e.g., Fink, supra note 17 (explaining that sustainable investing will be profitable for
BlackRock’s clients).
218. See Oliver Milman, Vehicles Are Now America’s Biggest CO2 Source but EPA Is Tearing Up
Regulations, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/jan/01
/vehicles-climate-change-emissions-trump-administration [https://perma.cc/82W4-9J59].
219. What Is Climate Change? A Really Simple Guide, BBC NEWS (May 5, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-24021772 [https://perma.cc/96DV-9FVE].
220. Anthony Arguez, Shannan Hurley, Anand Inamdar, Laurel Mahoney, Ahira Sanchez-Lugo &
Lilian Yang, Should We Expect Each Year in the Next Decade (2019–28) to Be Ranked Among the
Top 10 Warmest Years Globally?, 101 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y E655, E656 tbl.1 (2020).
221. Id.
222. Id. at E661.
223. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 4
(Valerie Masson-Delmotte et al. eds., 2018) [hereinafter GLOBAL WARMING].
224. Id.
225. Id. at 7–10.
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availability, reduced levels of drinking water, abnormal weather patterns,
increased natural disaster risk, and many other problems.226 Scientists
again predict these trends will continue well into the future.227 Moreover,
climate change disproportionately affects minority groups and
impoverished communities.228
Slowing climate change remains vital to our survival as a species.229
Some climate experts have argued that civilization could start to collapse
by 2050 if humans do not take immediate action to slow global
warming.230 Two degrees Celsius of global warming poses significantly
greater risks than one-and-a-half degrees Celsius.231 Though some
disagreement exists about exactly how much time we have to change the
trajectory of global warming or whether we have already reached the
tipping point,232 it is clear that we must take immediate action for any
chance of survival.233
Despite increased focus on climate change globally, greenhouse gas
emissions rose in the United States in 2018 by 2.7%.234 Some global
leaders have shown an unwillingness to address the problem of climate
change.235 Likewise, the initiatives that have been launched by global
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 9. For a more in-depth look on how climate change disproportionately impacts poor and
minority communities, see generally S. Nazrul Islam & John Winkel, Climate Change and Social
Inequality (U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affs., Working Paper, Paper No. 152, 2017),
https://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2017/wp152_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/MLA5-YT8E].
229. See GLOBAL WARMING, supra note 223, at 7–10.
230. DAVID SPRATT & IAN DUNLOP, BREAKTHROUGH NAT’L CTR. FOR CLIMATE RESTORATION,
EXISTENTIAL CLIMATE-RELATED SECURITY RISK: A SCENARIO APPROACH 8–9 (2019),
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/148cb0_a1406e0143ac4c469196d3003bc1e687.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4MGB-DQRJ].
231. See GLOBAL WARMING, supra note 223, at 7–10.
232. Fred Pearce, As Climate Change Worsens, a Cascade of Tipping Points Looms, YALE ENV’T
360 (Dec. 5, 2019), https://e360.yale.edu/features/as-climate-changes-worsens-a-cascade-of-tippingpoints-looms [https://perma.cc/BZ3A-F5ZD] (“Some tipping points . . . may already have been
breached at the current 1 degree C of warming.”).
233. Id.
234. Perry Lindstrom, U.S. Energy-Related CO2 Emissions Rose in 2018 for the First Year Since
2014, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.: TODAY IN ENERGY (Nov. 26, 2019),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=42115 [https://perma.cc/FCR2-8S5Q].
235. See, e.g., Carolyn Kormann, When Will Australia’s Prime Minister Accept the Reality of the
Climate Crisis?, NEW YORKER (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/whenwill-australias-prime-minister-accept-the-reality-of-the-climate-crisis [https://perma.cc/BME7LLCN] (describing Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s allegiance to the fossil fuel industry);
Juliet Eilperin, Josh Dawsey & Brady Dennis, White House Update of Key Environmental Law Would
Exclude Climate Change, WASH. POST (Jan. 3, 2020, 5:43 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
climate-environment/white-house-update-of-key-environmental-law-would-exclude-climate-
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leaders thus far have done little to address the issue.236
The Paris Agreement is a prime example of a government-led climate
change initiative that is unlikely to achieve its desired climate goals.237
The agreement involved 196 parties to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change who contracted in December 2015 to
implement changes that would limit the global temperature rise to less
than two degrees Celsius.238 The agreement requires each member country
to comply with “nationally determined contributions,” which are
effectively individual emission-reduction plans.239 Although the United
States is one of the largest emitters of CO2,240 the Trump Administration
chose to withdraw from the Paris Agreement.241 This renders the
agreement much less valuable than it would be with
American participation.242
Domestic efforts to curb climate change have fallen flat as well,243 and
those that have seen success have not gone far enough to address the
severity of the climate crisis.244 Some states have taken steps on their own
change/2020/01/03/35491e10-2e89-11ea-9b60-817cc18cf173_story.html [https://perma.cc/3RA4ZRB9] (explaining President Donald Trump’s rollback of Obama-era climate change initiatives).
236. U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2019: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 (2019)
[hereinafter EMISSIONS GAP REPORT], https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.
11822/30798/EGR19ESEN.pdf?sequence=13 [https://perma.cc/5S45-EHG7].
237. What Is the Paris Agreement?, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/what-is-the-paris-agreement (last
visited Nov. 11, 2020).
238. Id.
239. Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement
/nationally-determined-contributions-ndcs (last visited Oct. 19, 2020).
240. Emissions Data, supra note 5.
241. Rebecca Hersher, U.S. Formally Begins to Leave the Paris Climate Agreement, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (Nov. 4, 2019, 3:46 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/04/773474657/u-s-formally-beginsto-leave-the-paris-climate-agreement [https://perma.cc/8AKF-TFVR].
242. Id. The United States, along with other wealthy countries, also pledged to help developing
countries meet their emissions goals. Id. The loss of the United States from the Paris Agreement thus
extends further than our own borders.
243. Compare Press Release, The White House Off. of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: President
Obama to Announce Historic Carbon Pollution Standards for Power Plants (Aug. 3, 2015),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/03/fact-sheet-president-obamaannounce-historic-carbon-pollution-standards [https://perma.cc/9R4P-RZ5V] (describing the Obama
administration’s Clean Power Plan which set standards to for carbon emissions from power plants),
with Press Release, The Env’t Prot. Agency Press Off., EPA Finalizes Affordable Clean Energy Rule,
Ensuring Reliable, Diversified Energy Resources by Protecting our Environment (June 19, 2019),
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-finalizes-affordable-clean-energy-rule-ensuring-reliablediversified-energy [https://perma.cc/2SRL-38D2] (describing the Trump administration’s Affordable
Clean Energy Rule which replaced the Clean Power Plan, set guidelines for reducing carbon
emissions rather than requirements, and left specific action up to the states).
244. See EMISSIONS GAP REPORT, supra note 236, at 4.
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to enact policies to curb emissions,245 but the efforts of state governments
are necessarily limited in scope. Moreover, fewer than half of states have
taken the initiative to enact these kinds of policies aimed at curbing
CO2 emissions.246
Although climate change has become a global concern with potentially
catastrophic consequences, governments have been slow to respond to the
impending effects of climate change. Government efforts on the global,
national, and state levels have thus far been ineffective at curbing the rise
in global temperatures.
B.

Response of Private Actors to Environmental Concerns

In contrast to governments, companies have increasingly recognized
their role in the climate crisis.247 Some companies have started to look at
becoming more environmentally friendly and enacting sustainability
practices, recognizing that these initiatives could lead to long-term
profitability.248 Shareholders and employees also put pressure on
corporations to address the climate crisis.249 Further, many corporations
operate on a global scale and a company policy to reduce emissions could
thus have an impact beyond the borders of a single country.
At the annual World Economic Forum in January 2020, 140 business
leaders vowed “to develop a core set of common metrics to track
environmental and social responsibility.”250 The same week, Steven
Mnuchin, the U.S. Treasury Secretary, downplayed the severity of the
crisis, stating bluntly: “We don’t believe there should be carbon
taxes . . . [w]e think that industry can deal with this issue on its own.” 251
245. See, e.g., Chandler Green, 7 Ways U.S. States Are Leading Climate Action, U.N. FOUND. (May
30, 2019), https://unfoundation.org/blog/post/7-ways-u-s-states-are-leading-climate-action/
[https://perma.cc/8Z76-992M] (explaining how states are taking action on climate change, such as
setting higher emissions standards and creating financing opportunities for clean-energy projects).
246. State Climate Policy Maps, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLS.,
https://www.c2es.org/content/state-climate-policy/ [https://perma.cc/N5NE-GH2D].
247. See, e.g., Lucas, supra note 19 (discussing Starbucks’s new sustainability initiatives and its
goal to become “resource positive” by 2030); Sorkin, supra note 20 (explaining that BlackRock
investments announced it will “make investment decisions with environmental sustainability as a
core goal”).
248. See, e.g., Fink, supra note 17 (“[W]e believe that sustainable investing is the strongest
foundation for client portfolios going forward.”).
249. See, e.g., Colin Lecher, Thousands of Amazon Employees Ask the Company to Adopt a Climate
Change Plan, THE VERGE (Apr. 10, 2019, 1:22 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/4/10/
18304800/amazon-employees-open-letter-climate-change-plan [https://perma.cc/P995-3NQ2]
(discussing an open letter from Amazon employees asking the company to take action on
climate change).
250. Gelles & Sengupta, supra note 216.
251. Id.
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This contrast provides a glaring example of the different outlooks held by
governments and corporations, and demonstrates that even U.S.
leadership plans to rely on industry to solve the problem.
Juxtaposed with Mnuchin’s statements, in that same month the CEO of
BlackRock Investments, Larry Fink, released his annual letter to CEOs
emphasizing the company’s plan to address climate change.252 In the
letter, Fink stated that “[c]limate change has become a defining factor in
companies’ long-term prospects.”253 He also notably emphasized that
BlackRock will be “making sustainability integral to portfolio
construction and risk management; exiting investments that present a high
sustainability-related risk.”254 BlackRock’s letter informed companies it
invests in that they must provide BlackRock with disclosure reports
regarding sustainability and climate-related risks.255 He further stated that
BlackRock “will be increasingly disposed to vote against management
and board directors when companies are not making sufficient progress
on sustainability-related disclosures and the business practices and plans
underlying them.”256 Given that BlackRock manages nearly $7 trillion in
investments,257 the letter is sure to make waves. And in some ways, it
already has. Shortly after Fink released his letter, large companies like
Microsoft,258 Delta Airlines,259 and Starbucks260 all made new pledges
involving climate change. While these entities can afford to take large and
costly steps to address their contribution to climate change, smaller
companies may not have that option if forced to act unilaterally. In other
words, in order for smaller companies to make progress reducing their
carbon footprint, they may need to pool their resources with other firms
or, at the very least, have assurance that other firms will take similar
costly steps.

252. Fink, supra note 17.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Sorkin, supra note 20.
258. Camila Domonoske, Microsoft Pledges to Remove from the Atmosphere All the Carbon It Has
Ever Emitted, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 16, 2020, 2:25 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/
01/16/796758230/microsoft-pledges-to-remove-from-the-atmosphere-all-the-carbon-its-everemitted [https://perma.cc/HH64-5M85].
259. Tracy Rucinski, Delta to Invest $1 Billion to Curb Global Air Travel’s Climate Impact,
REUTERS (Feb. 14, 2020, 5:03 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climate-change-deltaair/delta-to-invest-1-billion-to-curb-global-air-travels-climate-impact-idUSKBN2081FY
[https://perma.cc/BQV8-7D2L].
260. Lucas, supra note 19.
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Scholarly Views on Considering Environmental Policy in
Antitrust Law

The general view among antitrust scholars is that antitrust law is not
the proper channel to address regulatory concerns such as environmental
policy.261 Enforcement agencies have viewed agreements involving
climate change in the same way as those involving other ethical and social
considerations, stressing that the social benefits of the agreements cannot
be taken into account as procompetitive justifications.262 Further, antitrust
jurisprudence emphasizes that legislative bodies are better suited to
address ethical and moral considerations—not the courts.263 The DOJ and
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) may be similarly unfit to determine
such matters through non-enforcement decisions.264 The Supreme Court
has said itself that “we may assume that competition is not entirely
conducive to ethical behavior, but that is not a reason, cognizable under
the Sherman Act, for doing away with competition.”265
Other scholars argue that antitrust laws can hinder potential solutions
to environmental problems.266 For example, Jonathan Adler argues that
many environmental problems can be seen as tragedies of the commons—
where every person behaves in a self-interested manner that ultimately
creates a detriment to broader society.267 A tragedy of the commons exists
when individuals’ interests are contrary to the community’s interests.268
In the fishing context, for example, each individual person would benefit
from catching as many fish as possible, but broader society would benefit
from limiting each person’s fishing to protect the fish population. Adler
explains that restraints on fishing can solve the tragedy of the commons

261. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 131, at 104–05.
262. Delrahim, supra note 15.
263. See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689–90 (1978) (stating
that arguments by litigants to create exemptions to antitrust law for certain industries should be made
to Congress, not the courts); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221–22 (1940)
(“Congress has not left with us the determination of whether or not particular price-fixing schemes
are wise or unwise, healthy or destructive. . . . If such a shift is to be made, it must be done by
the Congress.”).
264. See, e.g., Delrahim, supra note 15 (stating that the DOJ Antitrust Division cannot “refrain
from examining possible anti-competitive conduct because it would be politically unpopular”).
265. Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 696.
266. See, e.g., Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 STAN. L.
REV. 137, 176–80 (2019) (explaining that while at times antitrust law can mandate
environmentally-friendly behavior, it can also prohibit and disincentivize environmentally-friendly
behavior).
267. Jonathan H. Adler, Conservation Through Collusion: Antitrust as an Obstacle to Marine
Resource Conservation, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 9–10 (2004).
268. See id. at 9.
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problem of overfishing.269 Antitrust disallows the creation of some of
these community-oriented restraints. Antitrust laws may therefore
exacerbate these types of environmental problems.270
D.

The Auto Industry as a Case Study

Despite the environmental threat posed by lower emissions standards,
the DOJ opened an antitrust investigation into four automakers who came
to an agreement with California to heighten vehicle emissions
standards.271 This agreement was in response to the low emissions
standards set by the Trump administration—a stark reversal of those set
by the Obama administration.272 The car manufacturers and California
stated that an agreement on emissions standards was necessary due to the
nature of the car industry.273 Namely, they argued that the automakers
need the ability to predict future emissions standards to develop
appropriate technology and begin to manufacture new vehicles.274 The
agreement was therefore touted as one that would provide certainty and
stability to industry professionals on top of improving
automobile emissions.275
The Justice Department was, at least initially, unwilling to accept that
argument.276 Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim made multiple
statements, citing cases such as National Society of Professional
Engineers and Superior Trial Court Lawyers to support his argument that
antitrust has never allowed moral considerations to factor into its analyses
of potentially anticompetitive agreements.277 Throughout the DOJ’s
investigation, it remained unclear what their legal argument could rest on.
If the automakers had agreed with California to increase emissions
standards, state action immunity would likely protect the agreement,
269. See id. at 24–25.
270. Id. at 25. There is a federal antitrust exemption for fishing cooperatives: The Fisherman’s
Collective Marketing Act (FCMA), 15 U.S.C. § 521. Adler argues that the exemption is too narrow,
in part because members of cooperatives must “deal primarily in the products of its members.” Adler,
supra note 267, at 39. He provides an example of a catfish processer, Delta Pride Catfish, Inc., that
was denied protection under the exemption because it was in agreement with two larger firms that
were “more fully integrated” and thus not “farmers” within the definition of the Act. Id. at 40.
271. Tabuchi & Davenport, supra note 6.
272. Id.
273. Davenport & Tabuchi, supra note 1.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Delrahim, supra note 15.
277. Id. (“[T]he Supreme Court has struck down collective efforts by engineers to enhance ‘public
safety’ as well as a collective effort by criminal defense lawyers with the goal of improving quality
of representation for ‘indigent criminal defendants.’”).
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assuming there was ongoing state supervision.278 Alternatively, if the
automakers agreed with each other to petition California for higher
emissions standards and California complied, the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine would likely protect the agreement.279
At the time, no evidence seemed to exist that the automakers had agreed
amongst themselves at all. In fact, California repeatedly emphasized that
each company entered into a separate agreement with the state—not with
one another.280 Thus, many believed the investigation was improper
because no agreement between the automakers ever occurred.281 The DOJ
dropped the investigation five months later.282
Four months after the DOJ dropped the investigation, a whistleblower
from the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division testified in front of the
House Judiciary Committee to notify the committee of his concerns over
some recent antitrust investigations conducted by the DOJ, including the
automaker investigation.283 The whistleblower, John Elias, expressed his
concern that the DOJ had opened the investigation in response to a series
of tweets by President Trump284 without considering the viability of the
claim—in contravention of typical DOJ practice.285 Indeed, the DOJ
opened the investigation on August 22, 2019—one day after Trump’s
tweets criticizing the automakers’ agreement with California.286 In

278. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Are Regulatory Agreements to Address Climate Change
Anticompetitive?, REGUL. REV. (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/09/11/
hovenkamp-are-regulatory-agreements-to-address-climate-change-anticompetitive/
[https://perma.cc/G59W-BMBL]; see also supra section I.C.
279. See Keith Goldberg, Trump, DOJ Turn Up Heat on Calif. Car Emissions Deal, LAW360 (Sept.
6, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1196186/print?section=California [https://perma.cc/
LS69-HDPG]; see also supra section I.C.
280. David McLaughlin & Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Newsom Applauds End of U.S. Probe of
Automakers Over California Emissions Deal, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2020, 2:16 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/business/autos/story/2020-02-07/us-ends-antitrust-probe-of-automakersover-california-emissions-deal [https://perma.cc/NRA5-N5AQ].
281. Goldberg, supra note 279.
282. Davenport, supra note 7.
283. DOJ Oversight Hearing, supra note 8.
284. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Aug. 21, 2019, 7:38 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1164169890917433346 [https://perma.cc/ZY2UMWZP]; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Aug. 21, 2019, 5:01 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1164311594081247233 [https://perma.cc/X9AGAJSB]; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Aug. 21, 2019, 5:01 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1164311597587685376 [https://perma.cc/LT92LAWD].
285. DOJ Oversight Hearing, supra note 8.
286. Ryan Beene, DOJ Blasted for Automaker Probe Following Angry Trump Tweets, AUTO.
NEWS (June 24, 2020, 4:48 PM), https://www.autonews.com/regulation-safety/doj-blastedautomaker-probe-following-angry-trump-tweets [https://perma.cc/V8NV-YYKV].
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response to the whistleblower’s testimony, Assistant Attorney General
Delrahim wrote a letter explaining that (1) the investigation was proper
and narrowly tailored, (2) the timing of Trump’s tweet was purely
coincidental, and (3) political appointees are fully capable of running the
Justice Department.287 He also made clear that the DOJ terminated the
investigation because the department found that the automakers had never
entered into an agreement.288
The automakers in this case escaped prosecution, but the DOJ’s inquiry
alone may have made the agreement less effective than it otherwise would
have been. It was reported that at least one car manufacturer backed out
of the agreement as a result of the agency’s scrutiny.289 Additionally,
California had to go out of its way to emphasize that each company
reached a separate agreement with the state.290 But despite the parties’
efforts to ensure the deal would not attract antitrust scrutiny, the DOJ
persisted in its investigation.291 Based on these actions, it seems that the
companies felt largely constrained by antitrust laws, struggled to get
around them, and still ended up the target of a probe by the DOJ.
The automobile industry is one industry that could be transformed if
antitrust regulations were relaxed even slightly. Auto emissions were the
largest contributor to greenhouse gas pollution in the United States in
2017.292 This is true despite efforts by lawmakers and the EPA over the
last half-century to curb auto emissions.293 Further, the frequent change in
administration in the US means regulatory standards are constantly
shifting. This makes it difficult for industries like the automobile industry
to predict future needs and invest in environmentally
friendly innovations.294
In the case of the automakers in California, an antitrust exemption for
agreements with positive environmental effects may have persuaded more
than four automakers to join the agreement. But there is, of course, a
downside to this type of agreement in the auto industry: higher emissions
standards could reduce consumer choice and increase the cost of

287. Letter from Makan Delrahim, supra note 9, at 5–9.
288. Id.
289. David Shepardson, U.S. Ends Antitrust Probe of Four Automakers over California Emissions
Deal, REUTERS (Feb. 7, 2020, 1:56 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-autos-emissionsantitrust/u-s-ends-antitrust-probe-of-four-automakers-over-california-emissions-dealidUSKBN2012NP [https://perma.cc/J6TQ-2K2D].
290. McLaughlin & Dlouhy, supra note 280.
291. Id.
292. Milman, supra note 218.
293. Id.
294. Davenport & Tabuchi, supra note 1.
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purchasing a vehicle. This may leave some consumers unable to afford
their preferred car. But given the existential threat of climate change,
perhaps the long-term benefits outweigh these short-term costs.
Our understanding of both economics and climate change continues to
develop. The Chicago School vision of the rational person and
self-correcting markets has started to give way to the study of behavioral
economics.295 Even more importantly, climate change continues to
worsen, and people generally agree that it poses an existential threat to
our planet.296 Allowing for some cooperation among competitors could
help address some of our climate change concerns.
IV. SUSTAINABILITY AGREEMENTS WITH OR WITHOUT AN
EXEMPTION
Congress has the ability to codify exemptions to antitrust laws and has
done so numerous times in the past.297 Congress should pass an exemption
to antitrust law for sustainability agreements using the Dutch Guidelines
as a model. This would allow companies to enter into agreements
addressing climate change without fear of antitrust litigation. While this
type of exemption may increase the risk of cartel behavior, keeping the
exemption narrowly tailored and requiring quantitative evidence of
sustainability benefits can mitigate those anticompetitive concerns. In the
meantime, litigants should frame sustainability agreements in economic
terms to survive antitrust scrutiny and can use past precedent as a model
to do so.
A.

Congress Should Pass a Sustainability Exemption

Congress should adopt an antitrust exemption for sustainability
agreements similar to that proposed in the Netherlands.298 For agreements
that have anticompetitive effects, Congress can require companies to meet
the four main requirements suggested by the Dutch: (1) the agreement
must have sustainability benefits, (2) the ultimate consumer must receive
“a fair share of those benefits,” (3) the restraint on competition must not
be greater than necessary to achieve those benefits, and (4) the agreement
295. Francesca Gino, The Rise of Behavioral Economics and Its Influence on Organizations, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Oct. 10, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/10/the-rise-of-behavioral-economics-and-itsinfluence-on-organizations [https://perma.cc/AGP2-ELRZ].
296. Moira Fagan & Christine Huang, A Look at How People Around the World View Climate
Change, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/04/18/alook-at-how-people-around-the-world-view-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/6AUQ-XA63].
297. See supra section I.C.
298. See supra section II.B.
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must not eliminate “a substantial part of the products/services
in question.”299
While the broad proposal from the Netherlands represents the most
ideal solution, Congress could change the exemption in two ways that
would be more consistent with current precedent and also limit the risk of
cartel behavior. First, the exception could require companies to always
have quantitative data showing a certain threshold of environmental
benefits, regardless of market share. Requiring quantitative data that
shows benefits to a certain threshold could reduce arbitrary results. It
could also help to partially ensure that the agreement is not a cover for a
cartel in that the environmental impacts would have to be real, not just
suggested or purported.
Second, Congress could limit the sustainability benefits analysis to the
industry in question. This type of limitation may severely limit the types
of agreements companies are permitted to enter into because the
agreements would have to have an impact on the specific industry. But it
would be closer in line with Supreme Court precedent disallowing
procompetitive justifications outside of the industry in question.300
Take the automakers’ agreement as an example of how this kind of
analysis could work. Imagine that the four car manufacturers had agreed
amongst themselves to increase emissions standards rather than each
independently conferring with California. Under current antitrust law, it
is unlikely that this agreement would be illegal per se because it does not
explicitly fix prices or reduce quantity. But under a rule of reason or quick
look analysis, the agreement would almost certainly fail. Courts would
first examine whether the automakers have market power and whether the
agreement has anticompetitive effects. The four automakers at issue here
likely have market power,301 and it would be fairly simple for the
government to argue that the agreement would have anticompetitive
effects—the agreement could increase the price of automobiles and
reduce the number of options on the market. Assuming the court found

299. COMPETITION LAW AND SUSTAINABLE GROWTH, supra note 160, at 2.
300. See, e.g., United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370 (1963) (holding procompetitive
justifications in another market cannot justify anticompetitive effects in the relevant market).
301. See Patrick Manzi, Market Beat, NAT’L AUTO. DEALERS ASS’N (Apr. 2019),
https://www.nada.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=21474858178 [https://perma.cc/FN3X7FAN] (showing the four automakers’ market share is likely around 30%). One major factor in
determining whether a group of firms have market power in their relevant market is whether the firms
have a substantial share of the market. See Retrophin, Inc. v. Questcor Pharms., Inc., 41 F. Supp. 3d
906, 916 (C.D. Cal. 2014). “[M]arket power exists whenever prices can be raised above the levels
that would be charged in a competitive market.” Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S.
2, 27 n.46 (1984). Measuring a firm’s or group of firms’ market power is complex and beyond the
scope of this Comment.
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anticompetitive effects, the automakers would then have the opportunity
to put forth procompetitive justifications. Under current antitrust law, it is
hard to imagine what those procompetitive justifications could be.
Increased innovation may represent the most effective argument, but
because the automakers would not actually add a new type of product to
the market, that argument would likely be unsuccessful.
In contrast, if Congress granted an exemption similar to the Dutch
guidelines, such an agreement could survive antitrust scrutiny if it met the
four requirements. First, the companies would have to show,
quantitatively, that the agreement would result in lower CO2 emissions.
Given the evidence of vehicles’ sizeable contribution to CO2 emissions,302
that data likely exists. Second, the automakers would have to show that
their consumers would equitably share in the benefits. Consumers would
certainly stand to benefit from this agreement. Not only could reduced
auto emissions improve air quality and help slow climate change,303 but
car consumers could save money on gas.304 Third, as in current rule of
reason analysis, the companies would have to show that the agreement
was no more restrictive than necessary to achieve the benefits in question.
This may be a fact-specific inquiry, but with some further guidance,
companies could narrowly tailor their agreements to satisfy the
third factor.
The fourth factor—whether a substantial number of products would be
eliminated—would likely be the most difficult for the automakers to meet.
Analyzing this factor may depend on the specific terms of the agreement.
But, again, companies may be able to craft agreements to satisfy this
factor. For example, if the concern was that increasing auto emissions
standards would eliminate nearly all pickup trucks from the market, the
agreement could be crafted with different emission standards for sedans,
SUVs, vans, and pickup trucks. Having guidelines like those proposed in
the Netherlands would allow companies to craft their agreements to meet
the four required factors while still allowing them to work together to
address climate change.
The most complicated part of implementing this exemption would be
the way in which courts could weigh “public interest” factors with
economic ones. The benefit of the Dutch model is that it builds in less

302. See Milman, supra note 218.
303. David L. Greene, Charles B. Sims & Matteo Muratori, Two Trillion Gallons: Fuel Savings
from Fuel Economy Improvements to US Light-Duty Vehicles, 1975–2018, ENERGY POL’Y, July 2020,
at 1 (estimating that better fuel economy in automobiles in the United States led to “a reduction of 17
billion tons of CO2” between 1975 and 2018).
304. Id. (estimating that better fuel economy in automobiles in the United States led to $4.9 trillion
in fuel cost savings between 1975 and 2018).
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arbitrary standards than those in the South African and Australian models
because of its focus on quantitative data. In fact, the Dutch model fits quite
well within the rule of reason analysis currently used by American courts
because it could function as a burden-shifting analysis just like the rule of
reason. To further address the arbitrariness problem, the exemption could
require the sustainability benefits to meet a certain threshold, such as
reducing carbon emissions by a certain percentage. In contrast, a simple
public interest test would force judges to weigh sustainability against one
of the main purposes of antitrust law—preventing unfair competition.
Using the Dutch model avoids some of the arbitrariness inherent in the
public interest test analysis.
Not only could this exemption fit cleanly into current antitrust law, but
it also could be crafted to comply with the American Bar Association’s
guidelines for creating antitrust exemptions.305 First, Congress could
effectively consider the potential impact of the exemption on consumer
welfare given the wealth of information on the effects of carbon
emissions.306 Second, by including the two alterations mentioned above,
Congress could craft a narrow exemption to provide that “competition is
reduced only to the minimum extent necessary.”307 Third, the goals of the
exemption—curbing climate change—almost certainly outweigh the
goals of antitrust law because climate change amounts to an existential
crisis that will annihilate the planet if left unaddressed. And finally,
Congress could easily include a sunset provision in the exemption.
Although addressing climate change is vital to the future of the world
as we know it, some will likely argue that antitrust law is not the
appropriate avenue for tackling the problem. While companies could
plausibly make substantial progress in the climate crisis if allowed to enter
into agreements such as the one entered into by the automakers in
California, permitting agreements among competitors comes with a risk
of increased cartel behavior.308 But if we fail to curb climate change,
industry will cease to exist altogether, along with the rest of our planet.
It could also be politically challenging for Congress to pass such an
exemption. However, a bill aimed at protecting climate change
agreements from the reaches of antitrust law may be more plausible than
an omnibus climate change initiative. The bill would not involve spending
money or additional restrictions on businesses, which could make it easier
to pass than other climate change laws. Thus, even if antitrust law was not

305.
306.
307.
308.

See supra notes 84–85, at 38 and accompanying text.
See GLOBAL WARMING, supra note 223, at 7–10.
DOJ ROUNDTABLE, supra note 84, at 38.
See supra section I.A.
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originally intended to encompass moral or social considerations, the dire
need for action on carbon emissions, and the greater feasibility of an
antitrust exemption, indicate that antitrust law may, in fact, be a fitting
avenue for combatting climate change.
B.

Litigants Should Frame Sustainability Agreements in
Economic Terms

Absent a congressional exemption, litigants should frame their
sustainability agreements in economic terms to effectively survive
antitrust scrutiny. Courts widely agree that non-economic factors cannot
be considered in antitrust analysis, but litigants could attempt to frame
climate change considerations as economic in nature. Cases like NCAA,
where the litigants framed the uniqueness of the NCAA organization and
its capitalization of amateurism in economic terms, should be used as
models for how to effectively frame sustainability agreements as
economic in nature.309
To better explain this type of framing, imagine four coffee shops, one
on each corner of a busy intersection. The four companies want to invest
in sustainably sourced coffee, but it is more expensive than the coffee they
each currently buy. Loyal consumers, even if prices increased at one shop
and not others, would continue to frequent their favorite shop—valuing
aesthetic, crafty baristas, or something else over price. Thrifty consumers
would switch to a less expensive shop. But environmentally conscious
consumers may choose to switch to the more environmentally friendly
shop—valuing sustainable practices over the increased cost. To avoid
losing customers, the four shops agree to all purchase the sustainably
sourced coffee.
This type of agreement would be highly suspect under a traditional
antitrust analysis, but not per se unlawful. If challenged, the shops could
attempt to frame the sustainability benefits in an economic way. For
example, the shops could argue that coffee trees may go extinct if the
beans are not sustainably sourced. Thus, the entire coffee industry runs
the risk of disappearing if they do not make environmentally conscious
decisions. The coffee shops could even cite to scientific studies showing
the risk to the coffee industry of current farming practices to support their
argument.310 This type of legal approach is not guaranteed to work, though

309. See supra section II.C.
310. See, e.g., Aaron P. Davis, Helen Chadburn, Justin Moat, Robert O’Sullivan, Serene
Hargreaves & Eimear Nic Lughadha, High Extinction Risk for Wild Coffee Species and Implications
for Coffee Sector Sustainability, SCI. ADVANCES, Jan. 16, 2019, at 2 (explaining that at least 60% of
coffee species are at risk of extinction, threatening the viability of the coffee sector).
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it would fall closely in line with cases like NCAA, where the court viewed
an arguably social consideration—framed in economic terms—as a
procompetitive justification. Given the lack of precedent in the climate
change context, the result of such an argument may depend heavily on the
court and the effectiveness of the economic framing.
Capitalizing on Supreme Court precedent like NCAA could present a
strong framework for litigants seeking to survive antitrust scrutiny.
Framing an environmental agreement as economically procompetitive
may help the agreement survive difficult case law such as National
Society of Professional Engineers and Superior Court Trial Lawyers
absent an explicit congressional exemption. In dealing with antitrust
challenges to sustainability agreements, litigants should highlight the
economic effects that climate change is likely to have on the relevant
market and industry.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has emphasized the importance of allowing corporate
collaboration on climate change while maintaining the legitimate goals of
antitrust law. Courts have historically been the primary driver for change
in antitrust law, but courts are not best suited to address sustainability
agreements because of a long line of precedent disallowing moral and
ethical considerations in antitrust jurisprudence. Thus, Congress should
create an exemption in antitrust law for agreements among companies
aimed at curbing climate change. Congress should use the new Dutch
guidelines to craft an antitrust exemption for sustainability agreements
that is narrowly tailored to mitigate the risk of cartel behavior. Absent a
sustainability exemption, companies who find themselves on the wrong
side of an antitrust challenge should frame the agreement in economic
terms, emphasizing the impact climate change will have on their specific
market and industry. Perhaps antitrust law will one day evolve to
encompass environmental concerns but, in the meantime, litigants should
not hesitate to underscore the extreme economic effects climate change is
destined to have on many industries.

